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David Konstan’s Before Forgiveness: The Origins of a Moral Idea is a thoroughly convincing, en-
joyable defense of two theses: first, that “the modern concept of forgiveness, in the full or rich 
sense of the term, did not exist in classical antiquity< or at all events that it played no role 
whatever in the ethical thinking of those societies”; second, that “*forgiveness+ is not fully 
present in the Hebrew Bible, nor again in the New Testament or in the early Jewish and Chris-
tian commentaries on the Holy Scriptures; [and that] it would still be centuries—many cen-
turies—before the idea of interpersonal forgiveness, and the set of values and attitudes that 
necessarily accompany and help to define it, would emerge.” (ix)  These two theses, in turn, 
support a third: “the absence of forgiveness in these ancient cultures< involves a sharp dis-
tinction in ethical outlook, and may even be said to reflect differences in the ancient and mo-
dern conception of the self.” (ix)   
The clarity with which these theses are stated is characteristic of the book’s lucidity as a 
whole.  There can be no mistaking either Konstan’s position, or, I think, the success of his de-
fense.  The first chapter presents conditions for “forgiveness in the full or rich sense of the 
term.” (ix)  Subsequent chapters demonstrate its absence in Greek tragedy, Aristotelian ethical 
thought, ancient prose narratives, the Hebrew and Christian Bibles, and the writings of the 
Church Fathers.  A final chapter traces intimations of it in the early modern period and its 
more or less full emergence in Kant.  The tradition of thinking about forgiveness perhaps most 
familiar to readers of this journal—the one that runs from Arendt and Levinas through 
Derrida—does not figure prominently in the exposition. 
What is this “full and rich” sense of forgiveness?  Konstan says it “is a bilateral process 
involving a confession of wrongdoing, evidence of sincere repentance, and a change of heart 
or moral perspective< on the part of the offender, together with a comparable alteration in 
the forgiver, by which she< consents to forego vengeance on the basis precisely of the change 
in the offender.” (21)  These conditions are said to distinguish forgiveness, in this full and rich 
sense, from other responses to wrongs—on the one hand, from merely “forgetting” or “put-
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ting *them+ out of mind” and, on the other, from unilaterally absolving another, even in the 
absence of confession, repentance, and a commitment to sin no more. 
Of the conditions listed above, it is the first three—confession, evidence of repentance, 
and a change of heart—that are most absent from the ancient Greco-Roman evidence.  We 
have accounts of aggrieved persons giving over their anger but never, on Konstan’s telling, be-
cause the offender has confessed and demonstrated such a change of heart.  Offenders—in the 
Greek legal context, especially—rather express prostration and testify to the superior power 
and status of the offended person.  This could effect reconciliation of some sort, but it does not 
amount to forgiveness.  Aristotle might be thought to muddy the argument somewhat, since 
in his discussion of the quasi-emotion “calmness or calming down”—praotês—he says that 
anger is diminished towards those who admit wrongdoing and show regret. (Rhetoric 1380a 
14)  Konstan notes, however, that the remainder of the discussion of praotês is focused on rela-
tively different concerns: humbling oneself is the order of the day, not confession.  At one 
point Konstan suggests that “Aristotle’s discussion of the appeasement of anger is... focused 
entirely on relations of status and power,” a conclusion he moderates slightly when he says 
that it “has little to do with begging for forgiveness for an admitted wrong.” (25, 26; my italics)  
I prefer the latter formulation, which seems more measured, and also registers the fact that ad-
mitting wrong is the first reason Aristotle gives for why someone might “calm down” (outside 
of a realization that the offense was involuntary).  Either way, Konstan’s central point in these 
opening chapters is secure: Greco-Roman antiquity had an importantly different mechanism 
for restoring relations between injured parties. 
So too for the Hebrew Scriptures which, Konstan claims, also lack evidence of the “full 
and rich” conception of interpersonal forgiveness articulated above.  Forgiveness in the He-
brew Scriptures belongs almost exclusively to God.  Interpersonal forgiveness is quite rare, 
and any forgiveness that issues between persons is less an attempt to restore relations between 
them and more an attempt to restore relations with God.  Interpersonal wrongs, that is, are 
ultimately wrongs against God, whose mercy structures any and all conciliation.  Joseph’s 
forgiving of his brothers near the end of Genesis comes closest to modern, interpersonal for-
giveness, but even here Konstan doubts whether the criteria of confession and repentance 
have been completely fulfilled.  
Most surprising are the discussions of the Christian Scriptures, which I had thought 
positively enjoined interpersonal forgiveness among the disciples.  “Pray then like this,” says 
Jesus in Matthew’s account of the Sermon on the Mount: “Our father who art in heaven, 
hallowed be thy name< Forgive us our debts, as we have forgiven our debtors< For if you 
forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father also will forgive you.”  And, equally, this 
instruction from Jesus: “if your brother sins, rebuke him, and if he repents, forgive him.”  And 
most famously, in response to Peter’s “Lord, how often shall my brother sin against me, and I 
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forgive him?  As many as seven times?”, Jesus’ reply: “I do not say to you seven times, but 
seventy times seven.” (122) 
Konstan, however, again cautions against calling this forgiveness in the full, rich sense 
of the term, since the forgiveness does not come in response to confession and repentance.  It 
is hard to disagree with that conclusion, and it follows necessarily from the criteria for “full, 
rich forgiveness” established at the outset.  But this is where the audience for this journal 
might raise an objection.  For one of the great contributions of both The History of Sexuality and 
Abnormal, the 1974-5 lectures at the Collège de France is Foucault’s account of confession as a 
deeply historical phenomenon.  We have become confessing animals, Foucault insists—so 
much so, in fact, that Konstan can claim that no moral repair deserves to be called forgiveness 
without prior confession.  But perhaps we should say not that the Christian Scriptures lacked 
forgiveness, but that they lacked forgiveness predicated on confession.  
Historicizing the phenomenon in this way also helps recover some of the wonder of 
Christian forgiveness, which Konstan, in accordance with the strictures of his “full, rich” 
paradigm, casts in an unduly thin light.  Of the prayer to “forgive us our debts, as we forgive 
our debtors,” Konstan says that it “has the character of a pact or reciprocal commitment: to 
receive indulgence of others, in this case God’s, it is good practice to be similarly gracious 
toward those who are obliged to you, whether for money borrowed or for some other thing 
that is due.” (114)  And of the injunction to forgive “seventy times seven” times Konstan says 
that it “encourages a posture of general charitableness<” (122)  Both formulations—the latter 
especially—strike me as a bit anemic, since the injunction to forgiven “seventy times seven 
times” sounds like a radical demand, far in excess of some “general charitableness.” 
Konstan says that “Arendt< made the controversial< claim that the idea of forgive-
ness as a human capacity began with Jesus.” (112)  Konstan thinks she is mistaken since, as I 
said, he thinks interpersonal forgiveness does not appear until Kant.  I would, however, put 
Arendt’s claim differently.  She does not strictly say—though she may well imply—that hu-
man forgiveness began with Jesus.  She makes the different and, I think, provocative claim 
that Jesus was the “discoverer of the role of forgiveness in the realm of human affairs,” (The 
Human Condition, 238) and she insists that this is not so much a religious claim as it is a phi-
losophical one.  “Forgiving of those who trespass against us” has, for Arendt, a powerfully se-
cular sense: 
 
<Trespassing is an everyday occurrence which is in the very nature of action’s constant 
establishment of new relationships within a web of relations, and it needs forgiving, dis-
missing, in order to make it possible for life to go on by constantly releasing men from what 
they have done unknowingly.  Only through this constant mutual release from what they do 
can men remain free agents, only by constant willingness to change their minds and start 
again can they be trusted with so great a power as that to begin something new. (HC, 240) 
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The argument here turns on Arendt’s understanding of action and, more specifically, what 
Patchen Markell, in his wonderful Bound by Recognition (Princeton, 2003), named action’s “im-
propriety”—its irreversibility, its unpredictability, its tendency to out-run and escape actors’ 
intentions.  Were it not for forgiveness, Arendt argues in that wonderful last sentence, human 
life could not be lived freely.  The possibilities for self-disclosure inherent in action would, 
without forgiveness, be stillborn.  But, crucially, the forgiveness Arendt has in mind is not 
Konstan’s “full, rich” forgiveness but rather Jesus’ “seven times seventy times.”  This is all 
slightly orthogonal to Konstan’s central theses, which he elegantly establishes.  I mention 
Arendt only as a way of holding at bay the conclusion that “full, rich forgiveness” is the kind 
most worthy of admiration.  Konstan never says this, but readers might take his language of 
“full and rich” to suggest as much. 
In fact, Konstan ends the book with the suggestion that the ancients’ mechanisms for 
“restoring< a moral relationship” between a wrongdoer and her victim were “more candid,” 
“more coherent,” and less fraught with ambiguity than our own. (165)  The central ambiguity 
arises from our demand that the wrongdoer, in repenting, show that she has become some-
thing like a new “self,” and, precisely on those grounds, “deserves to be forgiven.” (163)  But if 
she is entirely new, what sort of connection does she have to her wrongs?  Who, in effect, is 
being forgiven?  If it is the new, totally-transformed person, why does she need forgiveness?  
If it is the same old wrongdoer, why does she deserve it?  By not making repentance and 
transformation a condition of restoring a moral relationship, the ancients (mostly) avoid this 
problem—such as it is—altogether.   
This is a thetic, careful, and convincing study.  My only reservations were the two 
mentioned above: first, that Foucault’s own historicizing work on confession could have en-
riched Konstan’s slightly-too schematic account; and second, that Foucault helps recover the 
mystery and beauty of Christian forgiveness, as both a spiritual and secular phenomenon.  
How much forgiveness is required for these trespasses, if trespasses they are, is something 
Konstan will have to take up with his confessor. 
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